Limitations of Actions - Fraudulent Concealment of Actions - Implied Exceptiion to Statute of Limitations by Mahoney, Shannon
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 3 Article 10 
1958 
Limitations of Actions - Fraudulent Concealment of Actions - 
Implied Exceptiion to Statute of Limitations 
Shannon Mahoney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mahoney, Shannon (1958) "Limitations of Actions - Fraudulent Concealment of Actions - Implied 
Exceptiion to Statute of Limitations," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 34 : No. 3 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol34/iss3/10 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NORThi DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [
loss himself or spreading the rk via insurance. 4 The'justification for impos-
ing liability upon tavern operators is that the right to engage in the liquor
business is not absolute, but is a privilege granted by the state.5 . Thus the
privilege can be encumbered with vicarious liability.6
It would appear that a party suing under the provisions of such acts has
stated a good cause of action if the following elements are shown: (1) in-
toxication of the party causing the damage as the result of defendant-ven-
dor's sale of intoxicating liquor; (2) damage or injury to plaintiff's person,
property, or means of support; and (3) noncomplicity of plaintiff in pro-
curing such intoxicants for the party causing damage as shown by the instant
case.
7
North Dakota's Civil' Damage Act s is similar to acts in other jurisdictions.
Contrary to the statutcry rule in North Dakota, the Supreme Court of this
state has held that cases arising under such acts are sui generis and *that the
only condition necessary for the award of exemplary damages is that a right
to actual damages be shown.I °  It should be noted, however, that in North
Dakota before liability attaches to the dram shop operators, they must have
dispensed intoxicants in violation of the laws pertaining to the sale, licensing,
and mantfacturing of alcoholic beveragesiL Hence, it is not sufficient to
show merely the three elements to a cause of action as mentioned above.
By incorporating such a provision into the act, the legislature has wisely ob-
viated the inequality which exists in holding a dram shop operator liable
without regard to any violation of a statutory duty.
JAIMES M. CORUM.
LIxIIrATIONS OF ACTIONS - 1 InAUDULENT CONCEALIENT OF ACTIONS - INI-
PLIED EXCEPTION TO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. - In September of 1932, the
defendant; a physician, performed surgery on the plaintiff, and negligently
failed to remove a portion of a surgical needle from the plaintiff's back. Al-
though plafniiff consulted numerous doctors between September of 1932 and
May of 1953, the needle was not discovered until the latter date. Plaintiff
4. See 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 775 (1957).
5. See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 24.1591161 (3d ed. 1949).
6. See Hill v. Alexander, 321 Il. App. 406, 53 N.E.2d 307 (1944); Hyba v. C. A.
Horneman Inc., 302 111. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939).
7. Krotzer v. Drinka, 344 I11. App. 256, 100 N.E.2d 518 (1951).
8. N. D. Rev. Code § 5-0121 (1943) "Recovery of Damages for Illegal Sale of
Liquor: Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be ini-
jured in person, property, or means of support by any "intoxrcated -person, or in conse-
quence of intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any peison, shall have a right of action,
in his or her own name, against any person who, by selling, bartering or giving away
alcoholic beverages contrary to the provisions of this title, shall have caused the intoxica-
tion of such person, for all damages actually sustained as well as for exemplary dam-
ages . . .
9. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0307 (1943) "In any action for the breach of an obli-
gation not arising from contract, when the defendant has been glilty of oppression, fraud
or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
10. Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1957), citing Thill v. Pohlman, 76 Iowa
638, 41 N.W. 385 (1889); Scahill v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 157 Mich. 310, 122 N.W.
78 (1909).
11. N. D. Rev. Code §§ 5-01--03 (Supp. 1957), Hf 5-04-06 (1943); see also
Sutherland, Statutory Construction i 5208 (3d ed. 19
4
3)srg'A-sthtute which refers to the
law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of: the: time the law is, in-
voked. This will include all the amendments and modifications. of the law subsequent to
the time the reference statute was enacted." .
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sued for malpractice and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, two justices dissenting, held that frau-
dulent concealment of a cause of action is an implied exception to the statute
of limitations. Hinkle v. Hargens, 81 N.W.2d 888 (S.D. 1957).
As a general rnle the statute of limitations commences to nun upon a cause
of action for tort from the time the duty owing to the plaintiff is breached
by the wrongful or negligent act of the defendant.' However, should the
defendant fraudulently conceal from the plaintiff the existence of facts con-
stituting the cause of action, the statute of limitations will not begin to run
until the plaintiff discovers, cr should have discovered through ordinary dili-
gence, the existence of the ceuse of action.2 Ordinarily, there must be some
affirmative act or representation made by the defendant intended to prevent
discovery of the existence of the cause of action.- However, if there exists
between the parties a fiduciary relationship, mere silence as to facts which
might affect the plaintiff's interests is fraudulent concealment.4 Courts have
held that the relationship between a physician and patient is fiduciary.5
Prior to the instant case, South Dakota followed the common law rule
which allowed fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations only
in courts of equity, where fraud was the basis of the action.; The Court, in
implying an exception, avoided the express provisions of the statute. The dis-
senting opinion condemns this usurpation of the legislative function on the
grounds that a statute of limitations is "unyielding and inflexible", and as
such should not and can not legally be avoided.7
Many states,s including North Dakota, 9 have solved this problem by enact-
ing statutes of limitations which expressly provide for an exception in cases
of fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. This removes the problem
from the hands of the courts and provides a clear and concise solution.
In absence of statute, the implied exception to the statute of limitations
is a necessary and reasonable means of protecting those persons from whom
a cause of action is concealed till the running of the statute. The courts must
be on guard, however, to prevent application of the doctrine where there is
no conclusive proof tE the defendant's knowledge of the negligent act. In
the instant case, fraudulent concealment seems to be a harsh term to apply
1. Archer v. Huntington Nat'l. Bank, 92 Ohio App. 229, 109 N.E.2d 677 (1952);
Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953).
2. Neff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.2d 165, 168 P.2d 423 (1946); St.
Clair v. Bardstown Transfer Line, 310 Ky. 776, 221 S.W.2d 679 (1949).
3. Stetson v. French, 321 Mass. 195, 72 N.E.2d 410 (1947).
4. Beatty v. Armstrong, 247 Iowa 302, 73 N.W.2d 719 (1955); See also Bowman
v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795. 176 P.2d 745 (1947) (The California courts, while
reaching the same result as the instant case, base their decision on the theory of estoppel.
The defendant is estopped from pleading the statute of limitations where he has fraud-
ulently concealed the cause of action. The defendant will not be allowed to benefit from
his wrong). Contra, Draws v. Levin, 332 Mich. 447, 52 N.W.2d 180 (1952) (A mal-
practice case, Fraudulent concealment means employment of artifice to. prevent inquiry
and hinder acquirement of a right of action).
5. Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 176 P.2d 745 (1947); Breedlove v.
Aiken, 85 Ga. App. 719, 70 S.E.2d 85 (1952).
6. S. D. Code § 33.1232 (6) (c). Schindler v. Spackman, 16 F.2d 45 (8th Cir.
1926).
7. Hinkle v. Hargeas, 81 N.W.2d 888, 890 (S.D. 1957) (Dissent); Lipp v. Cor-
son County, 66 S.D. 270, 78 N.W.2d 172 (1956); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, c8
S.E.2d 508 (1957).
8. 111. Ann. Stat. c. 83 § 23 (1954); Mich. Laws c. 9 § 609.20 (1948); Minn.
Ann. Stat. § 541.05 (6); Miss. Code Ann. § 742 (1942).'
9. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0124 (1943).
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to defendant's "silence" when it was not shown he knew, or could reasonably
have been expected to know, of the facts from which the plaintiff's cause of
action grew. By the very nature of his profession a physician must be held
to a high degree of care, but the law cannot consider him as superhuman
and omnipotent. Public policy considerations justifiably dictate many decis-
ions, but care must be exercised lest logic suffer to an unreasonable degree.
SHANNON MAHONEY.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM - EFFECT OF FAILURE TO ASSERT OR CLAIM
- IDENTITY OF PARTIES UNDER COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM RULE. - Plain-
tiff brought an action against defendant as the administratrix of an estate.
Previously, defendant, in her personal capacity, had recovered a judgment
against plaintiff for injuries arising out of the same incident. Defendant con-
tended that her recovery of a judgment was res judicata to the plaintiff's
claim under Rule 97 (a) of the Texas Rules.of Civil Procedure which pro-
vides for compulsory counterclaims.1 The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
held that the compulsory counterclaim rile did not apply since the defendant
had sued as an individual and the plaintiff had no cause of action against
her, while in this action she was sued in her capacity as administratrix with
the result that the plaintiff was not bringing his action against her, but
against the estate - a different party - and the issue was not res judicata as
contended. Robertson v. Estate of Melton, 306 S.W.2d 811 (Texas 1957).
A counterclaim is a cause of action in itself and seeks affirmative relief,
while a defense merely defeats the plaintiff's claim.2. It meets the plaintiff's
claim by opposing to it a demand on the part of the defendant to the end
that a complete determination of the right to and amount of recovery may
be had in the same action. It represents the defendant's right to have the
claims of the parties counterbalanced in whole or in part, judgment to be
entered for the excess, if.any.-"
Where the parties ale not the same in both actions, it has been held that
the failure to assert a counterclaim under Federal Rule 13 (a)4 in the prior
action did not preclude assertion of the claim in a separate and subsequent
action. In a case similar to the principal case, the plaintiff, as administrator,
brought an action to secover for the wrongful death of his intestate alleged to
have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff in a later
action sought to recover as representative of the beneficiaries, where in the
former action he had been acting on behalf of the creditors. The court point-
ed out that for the purpose of res judicata the administrator in acting on
behalf of the beneficiaries was not, under the death statute, the same person
1. Texas Rule 97 (a) is substantially the same as Rule 13 (a) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: "COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS. A plead-
ing shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the
pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurance
that is the subiect matter of the opposing parties' claim and does not renuire for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction,
except that such a claim need not be so stated ifiat the time the action was commenced
the claim was the subject of another pending action."
2. Secor v. Siver, 165 Iowa 673, 146 N.W. 845 (1914).
3. Olsen v. McMaken,& Pentzien, 139 Neb. 506, 297 N.\V. 830 (1941).
4. Texas Rule 97 (a) and Federal Rule 13 (a) both deal with compulsory count-
erclaim.
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